Abstract
I. Introduction
Imagine a parallel world, very much like our own. In this world, administrative law is radically politicized. If the question is the legality of an agency's interpretation of a statutory term, the court's answer can be predicted by asking about the political affiliation of the president who appointed the judges on the panel. If the question is whether an agency's decision is arbitrary or capricious, the court's answer can be predicted in the same way. In such a world, the crudest versions of legal realism would be vindicated:
Whatever the formal doctrine, the outcome of disputes in administrative law would be a product of the judges' political predilections. Administrative law would be a matter of judicial politics.
Fortunately, that world is not our own. Disputes about the legality of agency action cannot be predicted in so simple a fashion. 1 Unfortunately, however, that world has something in common with our own. 2 In the last three administrations-under
Presidents George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush-administrative law has been highly politicized, in the sense that on the courts of appeals, the evidence reveals sharp divisions between Republican and Democratic appointees, in a way that fits uncomfortably well with ideological stereotypes. 3 On the Supreme Court, the situation is even worse. Some members of the Court-above all Justices Clarence Thomas and John
Paul Stevens-show highly ideological voting patterns, in the sense that their willingness to vote to validate an agency's interpretation of law can be predicted, much of the time,
by asking whether the interpretation is conservative or liberal. 4 To say the least, this is a disturbing and somewhat embarrassing state of affairs.
Whatever one's view of the foundational questions in administrative law, no one should approve of a situation in which judicial voting patterns are highly politicized. 5 On the contrary, it is reasonable to read existing doctrines as an explicit effort to prevent such patterns from emerging. Consider Chevron v. NRDC, 6 which establishes that courts must uphold agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory provisions so long as those interpretations are reasonable. 7 Chevron is naturally read to say that resolution of statutory ambiguities calls for a policy judgment, 8 4 See Miles and Sunstein, supra note. 5 If agency decisions have an ideological skew, of course, it might be desirable to have a high level of invalidations; and if the agency's skew leads to a high level of unlawful "liberal" decisions, then a percentage of invalidation of such decisions would be nothing to deplore. The problem is that even if agency decisions are skewed in one or another direction, a large and predictable split between Republican and Democratic appointees would be hard to defend, and would justify a high level of concern. 6 467 US 837 (1984 to discipline agency decisions, not to give free reign to judicial policy preferences. It is disturbing to find that whether a court of appeals is likely to find an agency decision to be "arbitrary" depends, in significant part, on whether the panel consists of Republican or Democratic appointees. 13 The official doctrine opposes politicized judging; the practice plainly reveals what the doctrine explicitly opposes.
We have three purposes in this essay. The first is to set out in one place some of the most revealing evidence on politicized administrative law, with the hope that a brief overview of key findings will help to show what is wrong with the existing state of affairs. The second is to investigate a series of interpretive questions, which raise issues about how to construe the evidence, and about how seriously the current problem should be taken. The third is to explore several sets of possible remedies. One possible solution involves self-help without doctrinal change; another requires doctrinal innovations, for example through heightened deference requirements; a final one requires institutional change, for example through requiring mixed panels in certain cases.
One of the largest lessons is that while the problem of politicized administrative law is unmistakable, there are serious difficulties with each of the imaginable solutions.
For example, a general increase in judicial deference to agency judgments would help to reduce politicized invalidations, but it would also remove some of the beneficial features of the current situation, in which a strong judicial hand disciplines arbitrariness at the A clarification before we proceed: Many people are concerned about the politicization of administrative law in a quite different sense from our understanding here. In their view, a serious problem lies in the role of "politics," understood as interestgroup power, over the administrative state, especially in domains in which technical expertise should prevail. 15 On this view, the problem of "politicization" consists in insufficient regard for specialized knowledge. This is a legitimate and important concern, but it is an independent topic. Even if the judgments of administrative agencies sometimes reflect an excessive role for politics, in a pejorative sense, it remains important to ensure that judicial review of agency action does not radically differ depending on whether Republican appointees or Democratic appointees are on the panel. 16 Our goal here is to see how that task might be accomplished.
While our focus throughout is on administrative law, we hope that our elaboration of the problem, of the interpretive issues, and of the potential solutions will bear on many areas in which judicial voting is highly politicized 17 or in which public officials or others are divided along some controversial dimension or show some kind of bias. In any domain, self-help, doctrinal innovation, or institutional change might provide significant help. In some domains, one or another of these solutions might have more promise than in the context of administrative law.
14 See Peter L. 
II. Politicized Administrative Law: Evidence

A. Method
For a number of years, we have been studying judicial judgments in the domain of administrative law, in an effort to see whether those judgments reflect policy choices on the part of federal judges. 18 For present purposes, our method can be simply described.
Within the courts of appeals, our focus has been on judicial review of decisions by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). 19 This approach has the advantage of investigating one important executive agency (the EPA) and one important independent agency (the NLRB); it also presents certain advantages in terms of coding. We attempted to categorize agency decisions as Here too, unified panels explain a significant part of these disparities. On politically unified panels of Democratic appointees, the average validation rate is 23
percentage points higher when the agency decision is liberal than when it is conservative.
And on politically unified panels of Republican appointees, the average validation rate is 28 percentage points lower when the agency decision is liberal than when it is conservative. 38 Here as well, a form of group polarization seems to be at work. On mixed panels, by contrast, the partisan differences are greatly muted, 39 perhaps because of a moderating or whistleblower effect. In those panels, existing doctrine is again "working,"
in the sense that judges' arbitrariness judgments do not greatly differ depending on the political affiliation of the appointing president.
D.
The Supreme Court Here too, however, the individual rankings must be taken with many grains of salt. The sample size is too small to make most of the individual differences statistically significant. But it is both intriguing and suggestive to find that the four most liberal justices have the highest validation rates, while the three most conservative justices have the lowest.
Conservative partisans, liberal partisans. The individual rankings may be
entertaining, but for purposes of understanding of operation of existing doctrine, it is more instructive to place the Court's members into groups and to examine the differences between them.
Let us compare the Rehnquist-Scalia-Thomas group with the Breyer-Ginsburg- The former group votes to validate conservative agency decisions at a 58 percent rate, which is significantly higher than the 45.5 percent validation rate, for liberal agency decisions, from the latter group.
A brief note on politics, judicial review, and the future.
In light of the existing data, we can venture some predictions about the future. Suppose that a future administration issues a range of liberal decisions (in the sense that they are challenged by regulated industries). Such an administration will be highly vulnerable before RRR panels, and will be likely to do far better before DDD panels. To the extent that the federal courts of appeals consist of a strong majority of Republican appointees, an administration that issues many liberal decisions will have special difficulty in prevailing.
Within the Supreme Court, it is also simple to predict the nature of the internal divisions. We lack enough data for Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito, but at least in administrative law, it is more than mere guesswork to suggest that both liberal and conservative agency decisions, from a new administration, will produce the 
III. Five Matters of Interpretation
At first glance, the most important lesson is plain: Judicial review of administrative action shows a strong effect from the political inclinations of federal judges. In the abstract, this lesson is not exactly stunning. The problem is that existing administrative law principles are best understood as a self-conscious effort to prevent this state of affairs. Under Chevron, courts are supposed to invalidate agency interpretations of law only if the governing statute is clear or if the interpretation is unreasonable. 54 The doctrine and the practice sharply diverge, because the doctrine is an effort to prevent the kinds of disparities now observed on both the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals.
And as the Court understands the "arbitrary or capricious" standard, agency judgments of policy and fact are to be invalidated if they are unreasonable or senseless, not because they run afoul of judicial policy preferences. 55 Here too the doctrine and the practice sharply diverge, at least on the courts of appeals, where statistical tests are possible.
The partisan voting patterns seem to call out for some kind of remedy. But of course the evidence is not simple to interpret. Consider five difficulties.
A. Who's Partisan?
Begin with voting patterns on the Supreme Court. Is it altogether clear that Justices Thomas and Stevens are the most partisan, or that the two opposing "blocks"
show high (and nearly equivalent) levels of partisan voting? A skeptic would insist that in order to answer that question, we cannot simply stare at the numbers. 56 We also need to policy. To be sure, a careful investigation of the merits might require some amendments of the basic account we are offering, but the significant differences in voting patterns are most unlikely to be understandable in terms that neglect the political predictions of federal judges.
B. How Large a Problem?
It is legitimate ask about the magnitude of the problem. If Republican appointees showed a 10 percent liberal voting rate and Democratic appointees a 90 percent liberal voting rate, we might well be alarmed. But the overall partisan difference is far smaller than that-17 percent in the Chevron cases and 12 percent in the arbitrariness cases. Is that difference large enough to justify reforms or even substantial concern? It is clear that Republican and Democratic voting patterns should not be taken as politics run rampant.
The point is correct. But it should not be overstated. The disparity remains highly significant. And in one sense, our estimates understate the actual influence of ideology,
for the very reason that we have been exploring. When an agency must defend a liberal decision before a conservative court, it is more likely to settle, and conversely, when an agency must defend a conservative decision before a liberal court, it is more likely to settle. 58 The observed court decisions are therefore drawn from cases in which settlement is less likely, and the set of observed decisions does not encompass these cases (we do not know exactly how many there are) in which the judicial outcome would likely be predictably ideological. Were we to observe a counterfactual world in which all cases proceeded to trial, the observed decisions would include a somewhat larger share of (and thus a high rate of) predictably ideological judicial decisions.
The most important point is that it remains true that notwithstanding the evident In a system committed to the rule of law, to impartial justice, and to similar treatment of the similarly situated, this is a serious problem.
C. Ex Ante vs. Ex Post
Empirical tests can easily study decisions ex post, to see what kinds of voting patterns are displayed by federal judges. But an important question, and perhaps an even more fundamental one, involves the ex ante incentives imposed on federal agencies. On an optimistic account, the situation is far better ex ante than ex post.
As things now stand, agencies can be seen to face a kind of lottery. Within a certain range, their decisions will certainly be upheld, no matter the composition of the panel; and if the agency plainly violates the statutory text or acts in a patently arbitrary way, its decision will be invalidated, regardless of who sits on the reviewing court. And across a certain space of alternatives, there will be some uncertainty, with a range of probabilities of invalidation, depending on the composition of the panel. In that range, the agency's lawyers might be prepared to conclude that the relevant decision can be plausibly defended. Within a certain domain of that range, the lawyers might be able to add that the decision is more likely than not to be upheld in court. But they might be prepared to acknowledge, if pressed, that the likelihood of validation is well above 50 percent before a panel consisting solely of Republican appointees and well below 50 percent before a panel consisting solely of Democratic appointees.
In these circumstances, how will the agency proceed? To answer that question, we need to know something about the weight given by the agency to the prospect of invalidation, and about the agency's attitude toward risk. Exactly how much does the agency care about surviving judicial review? And is the agency risk-averse or riskinclined? The agency will face a probability distribution, and it will act in accordance with the perceived risks. Suppose that the agency cares a great deal about ensuring validation and also that the agency is risk-neutral. Second, politicized voting by panels may influence the amount of resources an agency invests in rendering decisions and defending them in court. 60 If the risk of a politicized invalidation is high, and if the agency is risk-averse, it is likely to increase its efforts to demonstrate the validity of its action. To the extent that the agency expends 59 To the extent that the composition of the federal judiciary, at any given time, reflects a well-functioning political process, with appropriate constraints on judicial discretion, this concern is admittedly alleviated. See Posner, supra note, for relevant discussion. 60 In any case, the ex post perspective matters as well. If important EPA rules are invalidated by all-Democratic panels, while they would be upheld by all-Republican panels, similarly situated litigants will be treated differently, in a way that ensures that the meaning of federal statutes turns on a kind of lottery. If NLRB decisions are won by unions before DDD panels, but by companies before RRR panels, something is seriously amiss. Even if the current regime does not have significantly different incentive effects from one with less politicized voting, it does serious violence to the rule of law, and it has a significant effect on ultimate outcomes. 61 Naturally, the argument works the other way for politicized voting that favors an agency. An increase in the chance that an agency faces a friendly reviewer may reduce the resources an agency spends in establishing the validity of its decision, and this may be undesirable when closer inquiry is warranted. 62 See McGarrity, supra note. 63 The best discussion remains Jerry Mashaw and David Harfst, The Struggle for Auto Safety (1990) (discussing effects of aggressive judicial review in discouraging agency rulemaking).
D. Invalidations or Validations?
An independent question is whether the best reading of the evidence emphasizes politicized invalidations. We have seen that the Republican invalidation rate jumps when the agency decision is liberal, and the Democratic invalidation rate jumps when the agency decision is conservative. These points suggest that agencies are probably losing This point is indeed consistent with the evidence, and it has important implications for possible responses. We will return to the question below.
E. Second-Order Diversity
Sometimes it is desirable to have diversity within institutions-as, for example, in the context of national legislatures. But sometimes it is desirable to have diversity across institutions-as, for example, in a situation in which Massachusetts attempts some educational reforms and Utah ventures others, or different law schools or economics departments develop different "schools." Heather Gerken has written illuminatingly of the idea of "second-order diversity," 64 which exists when different institutions, each with a degree of internal unity, produce a kind of diversity from which society as a whole might benefit. In some cases, second-order diversity should be the goal, not first-order. If society is able to learn a great deal from institutions that are internally unified but different from one another, and if those institutions do not do much damage to anyone, then second-order diversity might be better than its first-order cousin.
In administrative law, we can find a high degree of second-order diversity, made possible by unified panels. Might this be desirable? Consider the following account. With unified panels, a large number of ideas will inevitably make their way onto the pages of federal court opinions. RRR panels will offer distinctive interpretations of the Clean Air Act or the National Labor Relations Act; DDD panels will offer distinctive interpretations of their own. Perhaps the legal system benefits from this level of diversity. When courts of appeals are divided, the Supreme Court will ultimately decide, with the benefit of the additional information provided by a wide array of views within the lower courts.
In some domains, this defense of second-order diversity, within the federal courts, has a great deal of plausibility. In constitutional law, for example, the system as a whole probably benefits from RRR and DDD panels, which produces a range of disparate analyses of issues involving the Second Amendment, abortion, affirmative action, In these circumstances, it is not easy to defend the status quo by reference to the interest in second-order diversity.
IV. Solutions
Let us now turn to three sets of solutions. The first involves self-correction scrutiny-yet they too show highly politicized voting patterns. Perhaps an improved understanding of the degree of politicized voting could produce some good, but it is unlikely to make a significant contribution to solving the problem.
Warning flags and reviewing the reviewers.
A mildly more aggressive response would be to suggest that when a DDD panel or an RRR panel goes in the expected direction, a warning flag has been raised, one that justifies some form of oversight and review. Suppose, for example, that a RRR panel has struck down some regulation from the EPA, accepting a company's claim that the regulation is arbitrary or in violation of the governing statute. If the EPA seeks en banc or Supreme Court review, there is special reason to take the request seriously. Or if a DDD panel has acted in a predictable fashion in an important case involving the NLRB, and the NLRB seeks certiorari, the Court has an additional reason to wonder about whether the panel might have erred.
To be sure, there are evident risks with giving a great deal of weight to panel composition. What matters is the court's conclusion and analysis, not the political affiliation of the appointing president. At the same time, the existence of a unified panel, reaching the expected conclusion, does provide a clue that the conclusion and the analysis might be skewed. Indeed, it is likely that judgments about en banc review, and about whether to grant certiorari, are sometimes influenced by an appreciation of the composition of the panel.
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But this response would be at best a partial response to the current situation. It would impose on agencies the potentially considerable costs of appeal, an expense that would be spared if politicized decisions were avoided in the first instance. En banc review is necessarily rare, and agencies seek Supreme Court review infrequently, especially when their decision is invalidated as arbitrary or capricious; such invalidations depend on particular facts and are most unlikely to attract the Court's attention. 67 Even when agencies appeal, as we have seen that the Supreme Court grants certiorari in only a small fraction of cases. A warning flag may well be appropriate, but it cannot suffice to eliminate politicized voting.
3. Political rankings. We have ranked Supreme Court justices in terms of politicized voting, and it would be possible to far more systematic in this vein, covering lower courts as well. Rankings might increase the transparency of the current situation, which serve as a significant deterrent to politicized voting patterns.
At the same time, judicial rankings are unlikely to provide much of solution. They might not come to the attention of judges at all. They may distract judges from rendering decisions in accordance with law and encourage them to burnish their public perception as neutral. They may erode public confidence in courts to the extent that they reinforce a skeptical view, not at all supported by the evidence, that law is always politics in the 66 There is an important empirical project to be done here: Are unified panels in fact more likely to be subject to en banc and Supreme Court review? To reversals? 67 The distinction between Skidmore and Chevron raises many complexities, and the doctrine is producing a great deal of confusion in the lower courts. 73 Intuition and common sense suggest another problem: There is reason to think Skidmore review, authorized by Mead, may well ensure not a firmer judicial hand, but a situation in which judicial policy preferences play a (still) larger role than they do under Chevron. Skidmore. 75 Neither of these differences is statistically significant. We do not know whether greater differences would be found on the lower courts; the issue would be well worth investigating. But it is possible that the use of Skidmore, rather than Chevron, does not create more in the way of politicized voting. The more general point is that politicized voting remains high under Chevron, and hence the doctrinal shift from Skidmore to Chevron would not be likely to do a great deal about the real problem.
Increased deference. (a) The central idea.
A natural response to the data would be to argue for increased deference, or a kind of "super-Chevron," in judicial review of agency interpretations of law and judicial review of agency judgments of policy and fact.
If Republican appointees are invalidating liberal agency decisions at a high rate, and if Democratic appointees are invalidating conservative agency decisions at a high rate, then we might want more deferential review from both sides. If the evident aspiration of Chevron has failed, there seems to be strong reason to reduce the intensity of judicial review of agency interpretations of law. And if arbitrariness review is being conducted in a way that shows a significant effect from judicial policy preferences, then the most obvious response would be to reduce the intensity of such review. What is now a "hard look" on the part of reviewing courts might be transformed into a "soft look."
There are, however, three objections to this recommendation. 77 The benefits of that deterrent effect may outweigh the costs of politicized review. We have seen that in a sense, agencies face an ex ante "policy lottery" once their decisions are challenged, because they cannot know whether the panel will be RRR, DDD, RRD, or DDR. Other things being equal, the existence of that lottery is likely to ensure better decisions, simply because of a certain probability of invalidation.
The point applies both to agency interpretations of law and agency judgments of policy and fact. In both cases, agencies are likely to be disciplined by the existing standards of review. To put the point another way: The correlations between judicial ideology and validation rates do not demonstrate that all things considered, the current doctrinal balance between judicial ideology and agency error is the wrong one. Even if we could reduce those correlations, we might not be satisfied, because the risk of agency error might increase.
The second objection is that statistical patterns of the sort described here might rematerialize even with increased deference. Indeed, reduced deference might produce precisely the same patterns. lost. And for those who are concerned about politically motivated validations, increased deference would sacrifice a great deal.
We are left with the conclusion that both RRR and DDD panels should be careful about both validations and invalidations that square with their predicted inclinations, but with an understanding that a softening of judicial review is not fully justified by, or an adequate response to, evidence of politicized voting. Our own conclusion, admittedly not compelled by the data, is that some softening of review would be warranted, because politicized invalidations are the most serious problem. Most of the time, we believe that it is more troublesome if courts are striking down agency action than upholding it, because the political process contains a range of safeguards against arbitrary or unlawful action in the first instance. But we acknowledge that by itself, the evidence outlined here is not sufficient to justify this conclusion. In some domains, a special voting rule would undoubtedly make a great deal of sense as a safeguard against partisan voting. Unfortunately, the data suggest a large objection to this approach, at least if it is intended as response to politicized voting in administrative law. As we have seen, the most serious problem comes on RRR and DDD panels; it is on such panels, which are almost always unanimous, that the most politicized voting can be found. On RRD and RDD panels, the role of politics is limited and even hard to detect. Vermeule recommend, would seem perverse. Perhaps their proposal could be turned on its head so as to require unanimity to uphold rather than invalidate agency action; but it is an understatement to say that approach would present problems of its own.
C. Institutional Solutions
3. Mixed panels. Much of modern adjudication is undertaken by federal administrative agencies. Indeed, the National Labor Relations Board, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Federal Communications Commission do much of their business via adjudication. By federal statute, these and other agencies must have mixed compositions, in the sense that no more than a bare majority of their members may come from a single political party. 83 The requirement of mixed composition seems to have a significant effect. Recent evidence shows that the partisan affiliation of board members predicts their votes and that mandated bipartisan composition matters within these agencies. 84 Building on these precedents, we might be tempted to suggest that federal courts of appeals would do better, in many domains, if they had mixed compositionsand that in certain high-stakes cases, at least, mixed compositions might be mandated.
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As a direct response to politicized voting, there is a great deal to be said on behalf of panels of mixed composition. If DDD and RRR panels are the most serious problem, then that problem would appear to be solved by ensuring against unified panels. But a requirement of mixed panels would run against long traditions and would create both administrative and symbolic problems; there may be pragmatic objections as well.
Assignment to three-judge panels is now random, and it would be quite complicated to take steps to ensure that all such panels, in administrative law cases, have both 83 See, eg., 15 USC 78d(a) (requiring bipartisan composition of SEC Democratic and Republican appointees. Any effort, by Congress, or courts themselves, to move in this direction would undoubtedly run into serious political obstacles. In addition, judges are supposed to leave their political commitments behind once they become judges, and a requirement of mixed panels might seem objectionable insofar as it would be an acknowledgement that political commitments matter to judging. That acknowledgement might entrench the very problem that it is intended to reduce. Perhaps both Republican and Democratic appointees would come conceive of themselves, to a somewhat greater degree than they now do, as political partisans, simply because the requirement of mixed composition would suggest as much.
The question, then, is whether the problem of politicized administrative law is severe enough to justify strong medicine of this kind. We think that the answer may be affirmative, at least in cases in which the stakes are especially high. In such cases, the chief judge of the relevant circuit might consider adopting a general practice of calling for mixed panels. 86 The issue is whether other, less aggressive responses can provide adequate safeguards.
Conclusion
In the recent period, administrative law has been highly politicized in the sense panels reach a conclusion that fits with their expected predilections. Doctrinal changes, calling for heightened deference to agency action, would decrease the likelihood of politicized invalidations. The largest lesson is that there is more reason to trust the outcomes of mixed panels than the outcomes of unified panels. Whether mixed panels should be required, in the most important cases, is not a question that the evidence alone can answer; but it is a question that the evidence makes it reasonable to ask. Our largest hope is that an understanding of politicized administrative law, and of possible responses, will bear on many domains in which federal judges are divided along predictable lines, and indeed other domains in which entrenched differences, and potential biases, create potential difficulties for both private and public institutions.
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